The 
Introduction
The Market Towns Initiative (MTI), a regionally organized, nationally coordinated, but locally led partnership-based development programme, operated throughout rural England between 2000 and 2005/6. It was available to any country town with a population between 2,000 and 20,000 24 . The approach was developed by the Countryside Agency, a government "arms-length" organization (quango 25 ), and was supported by public and voluntary sector organizations. Its purpose was to help, populations between 1,500 and 40,000 are classified as small towns (Shepherd 2009, p.2) . However, to complicate matters further, within this range lays the Local Authority Rural-Urban Classification which defines Large Market Towns as those with populations of 10,000-30,000 (Defra 2102, p.6 ).
The Rural Development Commission (Rogers 1999) , the Countryside Agency's predecessor, used a population band of 2,000-10,000 during the 1990s. Although informed by experience, the choice was essentially pragmatic, in that the RDC, limited by remit, staff numbers, and budgets for grants etc., had to restrict the number of towns eligible for help to a manageable number. However, as defining a country town by population alone has proved to be something of a fool's errand, with service functions considered more important, the eventual MTI band (2,000-20,000) was more guide than command (CA 2000, p.1) .
27
Irrespective of definition, small towns are important, particularly given their roles as service centres, their geographical distribution, number, and diversity. Eventually therefore, interest in them grew, gathering pace during the 1980s and 1990s, and peaking in the years during which the MTI was operational. From the middle 2000s, however, when the programme ceased to operate, government priorities changed following foot and mouth disease outbreaks, and changes in policy direction in the responsible department (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) towards more pressing topics such as climate change.
The arrival of the present Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010 has not brought about a renewed interest in small towns. Indeed, their recent "rural statement" (Defra 2012) , makes scant reference and no specific commitments to them.
For the time being, therefore, national political interest in small towns has stalled. This is in marked contrast to the post-war period. Investigations into rural services, transport, and changes in the composition of populations were stimulated by interest in the counter-urbanization and deindustrialization taking place in rural England (Woods 2005, pp.72-90) . These studies were mainly ad hoc, and were done by academics for, rather than by, local people (Bracey 1952 , 1954 , 1962 , 1963 , Green 1949 , Pahl 1965 , Stacey 1960 .
Academic interest continued into and beyond the 1970s (Pahl 1970 , Mills 1980 , Courtney et al 1998 , Morris 2003 , 2010 , Wheway 2012 . From the early 1990s, organizations with rural interests researched and monitored aspects of rural life. Examples include "lifestyles" (Cloke et al 1994) , rural, as opposed to urban, society (Diocese of Hereford 1987) , incomes in relation to housing affordability (Bramley and Smart 1995) -still a pressing concern (Minton 2012 Ch6) -and specific work relating 27 It is perhaps worth noting that, according to research conducted by the RDC (1996) , there were only 210 retail markets, and 59 livestock markets in England within the population range selected for the study (3,000-15,000).
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to poverty (Nobel and Wright 2000, Morris 2010 (Sullivan 2007, p.1) .
Throughout this period, however, responsibility for major policy areas was increasingly centralized (Morris and Nichols 2007, p.30) , and local government powers and structures were altered. For example, the Local Government Acts of 1972 and 1974 dissolved rural district councils, many of which were centred on, and based in, country towns, and created fewer, larger, less local borough/district councils (Cloke 1983, p.201 (Stevens 2006, p.75) . Neither this reorganization, nor a subsequent attempt in the mid-2000s, were completed. Therefore, although the intention was to simplify local government structures, and reduce the number of authorities, the result was an increase in the number of structural types, with no significant reduction in number.
None of the changes to local authorities described above have materially affected the smallest, but most numerous, tier of local government -town and parish councils. Their powers remain substantially unchanged. They have few responsibilities but relative freedom to provide local services and facilities, such as the provision of allotments (i.e. land rented by individuals, typically for growing vegetables), clocks, and community centres (Stevens 2006, p.73) . Although the powers available to town councils are the same as those of the smallest -village -parish council, towns, being generally larger, can more easily raise money and employ staff.
Overall, however, the trend is towards "bigger", more centralized government. Arguments and debates about partnerships have been well-rehearsed. They centre on the shift from government to governance, and continuing political debates about the most appropriate scale, scope and structure of organizations and their responsibilities, be it at the regional or city-region level, for best effect (Bentley et al 2012 , Ravetz 2000 , SWRDA 2011 partnerships were relatively small in terms of membership numbers, geographical reach, and their finances, 30 these drawbacks were also noted by participants in the programme (Caffyn 2004 , Morris 2008 , 2010 ,
The reality, however, is that, by 2000, partnership working was deeply embedded in governmentsponsored programmes such as the MTI. This is evident from the description of the programme given in the next section, in which the research method is also described. Following this, and an overview of the research findings, some of the achievements of the partnerships are presented.
The MTI -origins, aims and approach
The MTI arose from two white papers specific to rural England (DoE /MAFF 1995 , p.57, DETR/MAFF 2000 . Designed and supported by public sector organizations, it was designed to be led by groups of local people, many of whom were volunteers. In part its creation can be attributed to the many people who, during the mid-1990s, throughout rural England, began to express, simultaneously and unprompted, concern about the state of their small towns. Much of the concern then (DETR 1998), as now (Portas 2011), was about the growth of supermarkets and out-oftown shopping centres built away from traditional small town shopping and employment centres.
Consequently, the MTI was primarily regarded as a "tool" to, "... help create new job opportunities, new workspace, restored high streets, improved amenities and transport facilities and help with community needs." (DETR/MAFF 2000, p.75). A total of GBP £32 million was allocated, over three years, to England's regional development agencies (RDAs), and GBP £5 million to the Countryside Agency. In essence the job of the former, economic-development orientated, agencies was to advise on and help pay for a variety of projects in the towns, provided the projects met the agencies' criteria for support.
The Countryside Agency's initial job was to design and develop a stock-taking and project planning process called the Healthcheck (DETR/MAFF 2000, p.75). This was used to help local people assess their town's strengths and weaknesses in relation to the environment, transport, accessibility, and wider social and community concerns, as well as the RDAs' primary concern, the economy. The
Countryside Agency also contributed to the cost of employing coordinators to help locals conduct Healthchecks, and project managers to help develop and implement projects arising from the Healthchecks. 30 The total MTI budget from central government was £37m. This compares with more than £2bn allocated to the New Deal for Communities programme (ODPM 2000 p112).
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The end of the programme in 2005/6 coincided with the closure of the Countryside Agency. The regional development agencies continued to support the partnerships in their regions, but the work gradually ceased, and the agencies themselves had closed by the end of April 2012.
The limitations of public sector "short-termism" are well known (Blackburn et al 2003 , p.45, DCLG 2006 . So too is the complicated nature of local governance (Hewitt 2011 , Morris and Nichols 2007 , pp.10-17, Morris 2008 3). It is not surprising, therefore, that the MTI's success, and its potential to inform future work, was limited by its short life relative to the time needed to embed community-led development into the complex network of local government and governance structures. Nevertheless, the programme lasted longer than the three years for which it was initially budgeted, and many of the partnerships continue their work (Carterton Town Council 2012) .
Estimates as to the number of towns that eventually took part in the programme vary between 227 and 240 (Morris 2010, p.21) . The former figure is the official total (Hansard 2007) . The latter, based on information gathered informally towards the end of the programme, is anecdotal. Irrespective of the actual total, the initial target of 100 participating towns (DETR/MAFF 2000, p.75) was exceeded.
This, coupled with the programme's extended life, and participants' broadly positive views, indicates, as discussed below, that, whilst limited in terms of achievements, local control and evaluation, 31 the approach was successful, and worthy of development. First the research method is described.
Investigating the MTI

The research method
All the information in this and subsequent sections is, unless stated otherwise, taken from the writer's thesis (Morris 2010) . In essence the research was an attempt to "tell the story" of the MTI through the eyes of local participants; there being little else in the way of systematic evaluation on which to draw.
Information was gathered via a postal questionnaire and semi-structured face-to-face interviews.
Although most of the participants came from the towns (e.g. chairs of partnerships, town clerks), some were drawn from surrounding, often traditional hinterland, areas. Officials and others involved in rural development and related policy and practice also took part. The questionnaire and interview guide were finalised following a series of trial interviews with a variety of people (professional, political, and lay) involved in community development in the UK, and, in one case, overseas.
Interviewees included the chief executives of the Countryside Agency and a rural regeneration charity, an official from a regional assembly, ad local authority officers and councillors.
31 My research effectively became part of an informal, uncoordinated and rather stuttering evaluation of the MTI work, aspects of which were investigated during the period when the programme was operational (ERM 2001 , Entec 2004 , Moseley, Owen, Clark, and Kambites 2005 . Earlier work assessed town characteristics and vulnerability (ERM 2001) . The MTI was never methodically evaluated nationally.
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Twelve questions were asked. Mainly descriptive, they explored reasons for involvement, expectations, partnership achievements and current operational status. Although the questioning was designed with qualitative answers in mind, some respondents and interviewees offered quantitative information suitable for analysis.
In order to corroborate the information obtained from the primary sources of data (i.e. the questionnaires and interview transcripts), some Healthchecks and associated Action Plans were analysed and used as comparative sources of information about the type of work done by partnerships.
Eventually, questionnaires and explanatory letters were sent to 48 towns, approximately 20% of the 227 towns that officially participated. Initially every sixth town on the official list was selected in order to ensure a degree of randomness. Following this, additional towns were selected to ensure that at least one town from each of the eight English rural regions was included.
In addition, the 18 Beacon Towns were included (DETR/MAFF 2000, p.75). These were selected, mainly by regionally-held competitions, both for the long-term (10-year) potential of their partnerships' topic work to help others, and to inform policy (Nichols 2004 (Nichols , 2005 . Their inclusion ensured that any points arising from their work on, for example, enterprise support, integrated service provision, renewable energy, migrant workers, local food, housing, and transport, would be captured. Dorset. The respondents and interviewees were representative of those involved in the work. They included local volunteers, town clerks, and councillors from all tiers of local government, officials from local authorities, and a regional development agency, and a regional government office. In all 28 partnerships contributed to the research, a participation rate of about 58%.
When transcribed, the data amounted to more than 37,000 words of fact and opinion. The information was wide ranging and informative, but, given the relatively small sample size, limited. Therefore, rather than attempt to establish causal links between, e.g. the extent to which a partnership's success was dependent upon factors such as demography, previous involvement in public sector programmes, a town's location in a development area, or particularly supportive local organizations, all of which are worth exploring, the participants' anonymized contributions were analyzed to allow their -mainlylocal stories and messages to flow. With the data reduced to a manageable and intelligible form, it was relatively easy to organize and present the findings. These are discussed in the next section.
Research findings were broadly positive, but ...
Essentially the research revealed the encouraging, though not surprising, finding that people care about the places they live in. They are prepared to work hard (for nothing) to improve their towns.
They have skills, and specific, as well as general and often professional, knowledge and experience.
Their views varied from the very positive to the less than enthusiastic. There is evidence that local loyalties, local knowledge, an awareness of local needs, belief in the ability of locals to identify and, given the chance, to solve problems, and capitalize on group and individual strengths, draw people together for common purpose and the common good.
Overall, the opinions given and experiences described were similar, with one significant exception. In relationships between the staff of the various organizations, a willingness to appreciate the different priorities of each organization, and the associated pressures acting on all involved. Matters were not helped by the fact that the finite life of the MTI meant that the data gathering and project identification/planning work (i.e. the Healthcheck, action planning) and the RDAs' budgetary need to spend MTI money on projects within the same timescale, often had to coincide (i.e. the two elements of the work were time constrained to be concurrent, rather than, as they should have been, logically, sequential).
However, a clear majority of participants thought that the programmes of work were broadly successful, although by no means perfect. When asked to rate their hopes, achievements and satisfaction with the programmes, rather than their projects, the majority of views were positive (Morris 2010, p.157) . Overall, the 41 projects given as examples of the work done, and illustrated in Table 1 , reflect this generally positive view. It is not surprising that participants' opinions and experiences were not entirely positive. Although it is probable that those with positive stories are most likely to tell them, those with particularly poor experiences are also likely to relate their tales. It is also probable, and particularly frustrating for the researcher, that, for reasons to do with, e.g., a lack of time, or faith in the MTI, those whose experiences fall between enthusiasm/success and exasperation/failure (i.e. the disengaged, the sceptical/cynical, the uninterested, and the conscripted), are the least likely to participate.
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The views and experiences reported by the postal survey respondents were matched by the fuller information provided by the interviewees. In addition, various factors governing the success of community-led development were identified by the participants in the research. These are illustrated in Table 2 . • Knowledgeable, individual, unpredictable, loyal, and opinionated, they are crucial, central, need to be nurtured and involved, and trusted with the truth about programme limitations.
• Need clarity about programme aims, limitations, and governing processes.
• Need clarity about local needs and agreed aims, for when a clearly-defined and obvious need exists, and is understood and accepted, support and consequent success can quickly follow.
•
Need mechanisms that enable effective and open communication -based on trust.
• Need support and training (not easy/possible with programmes that last only a few years).
Need to have realistic aims and expectations.
In the main have a natural affinity with, and loyalty to their town/area, and a desire to contribute.
• Need structures and processes that recognize that they tire, come and go for all sorts of reasons, and will one day need to be replaced (succession strategies).
• Disagree at times, and so need ways that encourage constructive debate and enable conflicts to be resolved. Time
• Pressure to start work and achieve quickly does not • serve local needs or ... • meet sponsoring organizations' aims in terms of success and value for money. • Short-term programmes do not suit long-term community development needs in terms of success and value for money. • Recruiting, supporting, and ultimately replacing people to do work that is often volunteer led takes time -in many ways the work never ends. Structures
• Partnerships need to be simple, stable and organized in such a way that they have defined delegated powers and the wherewithal to get things done, but ... • ... also need to reflect the fact that members (often volunteers) will tire, will change, and often have other responsibilities.
Need to be stable, capable of providing long term, consistent commitment to the development, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and approaches, together with a need to recognize that success cannot be guaranteed, for failure is always -an uncomfortable -possibility.
Need to be inclusive (the importance of the role of town and other councils in enabling and supporting communityled work should not be underestimated).
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The points made by participants (Table 2) suggest an overall lack of time, not only to allow people to prepare for the work, but also to gather sufficient evidence to support partnerships' plans and project bids. For example, the need for evidence was reinforced by an RDA officer, who noted that, in one town, "... a lot of the evidence base … wasn't apparent ...", before adding that plans in other towns contained ... a whole bulk of evidence to back up the plan ... ." This illustrates not only -the inevitable -differences in the quality of Healthchecks, but also hints at some of the reasons for such differences.
These differences include the availability of information, the ability (e.g. in terms of time, money, knowledge) of local people to find, collate and present information, previous local experience of, and benefit from, publically funded and administered regeneration programmes, and the amount of support available to partnerships from, e.g. local authorities and voluntary organizations. The fact that the programme was -unusually -available throughout rural England, and had a common methodological and funding format, means that evidence about the impact of these variables on the effectiveness of partnerships and their ways of working could have been gathered relatively easily. Although not comprehensive, sufficient information was obtained to enable some of the conditions necessary to minimize the likelihood of partnership failure to be identified. These are presented in Table 3 . One conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that more information about ways of working and likely success and failure factors could have been obtained from a formal evaluation of the MTI. This, and other conclusions, are discussed in the next section. • Sufficient time to form and organize partnerships, and to create and maintain relationships between members.
• Political and wider community support for the members of partnerships (i.e. greater awareness and support from local populations, with implications for the representativeness of partnership members, and need for democratic accountability recognized).
• Straightforward long-term processes and programmes that are designed to allow and encourage their evolution/development, and information/experience sharing.
• Partnerships with sufficient power and authority to develop and implement plans.
• Partnership members sufficiently well trained and supported to assume the necessary responsibilities.
•
Effective communication between partnership members and associated organizations.
Organizational and individual patience to enable the plans to be brought to fruition.
• Structures that take into account people's limited time and energy, and the associated requirements for personal/organizational development and succession strategies.
Conclusions
The MTI worked. The programme's structure did not, as Julia MacLeavy (2009, p.871 ) noted in connection with her analysis of partnership work in Bristol, "… constitute genuine empowerment.", but the aims and targets set for it were exceeded, in that far more than 100 towns participated, 18
Beacon Towns were selected (the initial aim was between 10 and 20), related programmes such as Gateway Stations and One Stop Shops were integrated into the programme, and the majority view of
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the participants was positive. However, if the programme guidance had included a requirement to evaluate as well as monitor the work done by the partnerships, then the experiences of the volunteers, paid professionals and other advisers involved could have been used to improve it, and to inform the development of subsequent, or continuation, programmes. Nevertheless, the concerns identified and the subjects discussed by those involved (Table 4) provide plenty of pointers towards future needs and work. Although work continues in many towns, the reality is that much is now essentially local and discrete, good is not in question, any more than is the willingness of many people to do so. However, the influence that the interested but unelected have on matters that could be said to be the responsibility of the elected, is, although beyond the scope of this paper, worthy of further research. For example,
given current concerns about globalization, the power of lobby groups, and the paradox of central governments that appear both remote and controlling, now would be a good time to revisit the roles of local government with a view to dispersing significant powers and responsibilities in ways that go far beyond the limited ambitions of clichéd terms such as "localism", "double devolution", and the imprecision of the "Big Society".
It is worth pointing out the obvious: councillors are community leaders (Morris and Nichols 2007, pp.10-11) , and are often, effectively, unpaid volunteers. Similarly, town councils, as stable statutorily constituted, publically accountable organizations, were well placed to play a leading role in the work.
Not all did, but those that were involved added value and provided partnerships with a measure of local democratic legitimacy.
As previously discussed, this is not to suggest that partnership working -or local government control -is a panacea. According to Ravetz (2000, p.263) , "While community participation is generally held to be a "good thing", it is cursed by fuzzy thinking. The "law of oligarchy" shows that in any group ... an inner elite will emerge to manipulate the majority." It follows that future programmes should build on the work of Healthcheck coordinators, and project managers (many of whom were essentially community development workers), and partnership members, to ensure both that the views and needs 33 That these organizations existed for barely longer than the MTI is indicative of the rate at which the machinery of government changes. Whatever the political imperatives behind such changes, it is indisputable that the inevitable disruption to people, programmes, and policy development and implementation, has costs that go beyond the purely financial.
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of the "voiceless" (e.g. the single parent, the unemployed, the frail, the poor) are heard and communicated to any "inner elites". It will also be necessary to ensure that sufficient skills are developed within towns to ensure that work can continue, when, as is likely, professional development workers leave to work elsewhere.
Given the hard work and achievements of all those involved in the programmes, there must be doubts about whether maximum value for money for the public purse was obtained. Although the MTI was broadly successful, an opportunity to learn was wasted. There was a failure to capitalize on the work.
Little has changed, it seems, to challenge the view of Lord Scott's committee's seminal review in the 1940s, that, "… our great failures, both in war and peace, have been due to a failure to think ahead and make plans in advance." (HMSO 1942, p.89) .
The MTI's lessons for today's policy and programme makers are simple to understand, and important.
Future policies must be designed to ensure that formal monitoring and evaluation is an integral part of programme implementation. This does not have to be onerous, as was demonstrated by the approach taken with the MTI-related Beacon Towns Programme. Based on relatively infrequent, informal visits during which the experiences, concerns and successes of participants were recorded and published, the process was simple to manage and relatively undemanding of partnership members and their time (Nichols 2004a (Nichols 2005 .
Finally, the research suggested that local democratic legitimacy and oversight of programmes such as the MTI remain important, and should not be subordinated to central government's desire to control from afar.
